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Successful Army National Guard Units—A Guard Perspective

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Regional Studies Program

SUCCESSFUL ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS—A GUARD PERSPECTIVE


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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ARNG	Army National Guard
AWOL	absent without leave
BN	battalion
MOS	military occupational specialty
NCO	non-commissioned officer
ORNL	Oak Ridge National Laboratory
RRAC	Recruiting and Retention Advisory Committee
RRM	Regional Recruiting Manager
RRPM	Regional Recruiting Potential Model

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This project sought to identify factors contributing to a healthy Army National Guard (ARNG) unit. It was carried out for two reasons. First, its results were intended to contribute to a computerized forecasting model under development at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The model, the ARNG Regional Recruiting Potential Model (RRPM), forecasts locations of successful new or modified Guard units. Second, the study was expected to enhance the understanding of what constitutes a healthy Guard unit. A Delphi approach was used to define criteria for healthy Guard units and to elicit rankings of those criteria. Two sets of telephone interviews were conducted with a sample of 102 individuals—two battalion-level administrative officers, or their equivalents, in each state and in Washington, D.C. During these telephone calls, the phrase "unit supportability" was used to express the notion of a healthy unit. The first set of interviews obtained background information and respondents' ideas of the criteria that lead to unit supportability and to a lack of supportability. The data were analyzed to develop a list of ten criteria for unit supportability. In the second interview, the same respondents were asked to rank those criteria in order of importance.

Leadership consistently was ranked as most important to unit supportability; resources and recruiting generally were ranked as the least important criteria. Although the results will not contribute directly to the RRPM, they reveal much about successful Guard units from the perspective of full-time battalion-level Guard personnel. The results are among the first systematic, rather than anecdotal, appraisals of unit supportability.

1. INTRODUCTION

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is developing a computerized model for the Army National Guard (ARNG) that forecasts sub-state areas in which new and modified Guard units can be located successfully. This model, the ARNG Regional Recruiting Potential Model (RRPM), is based largely on demographic and economic data. In the course of developing the RRPM, questions arose about what constitutes a successful Guard unit. At the time, the model used a fill rate (i.e., the actual number of people in a unit relative to the authorized number of people in a unit) as the operational measure of unit success. However, fill rate was not a fully satisfactory measure. For instance, a "good" fill rate might mask a high turnover within units. High turnover could mean an intensive and constant recruiting effort, repeated initial training of recruits, and low morale within and poor functioning of the units. At the other extreme, low or "bad" fill rates could obscure a stable unit that attracts and holds outstanding recruits. The questions raised regarding fill rate prompted a search for other measures that could be used in the RRPM to characterize unit success. A goal of this project was to improve the RRPM by developing or refining such measures. The other overarching goal was to enhance the understanding of what constitutes a healthy unit. There are many anecdotes about the elements of healthy and unhealthy Guard units; this study sought to investigate the topic systematically.

To achieve these goals, a three-stage research project was designed. The first stage was to obtain a definition of factors contributing to a healthy unit. The phrase "unit supportability" was used to elicit ideas about healthy Guard units. Unit supportability was used instead of "unit success" out of concern for giving respondents the (false) impression that researchers were evaluating the success of their particular units rather than eliciting information about the factors influencing the success of units

in general. Full-time ARNG personnel at the battalion level were to define unit supportability criteria. These definitions were analyzed and compiled into ten unit supportability criteria. Eliciting ideas about healthy units from Guard members injected an informed ARNG perspective into the research and modeling process and avoided the imposition of possibly irrelevant measures that come from a researcher's perspective.

In the second stage of research, the same Guard members who had defined unit supportability were to rank the ten criteria in order of importance. The rankings were to be analyzed to provide descriptive information about the relative value of the criteria for the nation as a whole and with regard to variables such as *geographic region* and *unit type*. Analyses were expected to discern interrelationships among the ten criteria. Such interrelationships would indicate whether certain criteria could be used as surrogates for other criteria and whether different criteria could be combined. The results of this stage of research would enhance our understanding of the attributes of healthy ARNG units.

The third, most complicated stage of the project was to use the research results to improve the RRPM, most directly by operationalizing (i.e., transforming into measurable items) unit supportability criteria and using them to improve RRPM equations. From the outset, it was recognized that incorporating subjective criteria into the econometrically based RRPM would be difficult. However, it was anticipated that an enhanced understanding of those criteria would improve ORNL's ability to model unit success and to interpret the implications of the RRPM's statistical underpinnings.

The remainder of this report describes the method of investigation and findings regarding definitions of unit supportability and their operationalization. It concludes with ideas for further research. Three appendices are attached to the document: Appendix A, which consists of the interview protocol used during the first set of telephone interviews; Appendix B, which reproduces

the questionnaire used during the second set of telephone interviews; and Appendix C, which summarizes the data that were obtained from the first interviews but were not analyzed for this study.

2. METHODS*

A Delphi method was used to obtain definitions of unit supportability. Delphi methods have been used by social scientists to elicit and weight experts' opinions (Carley 1986; Merkhofer 1986). Delphi methods are iterative in that individuals are interviewed at least twice; in each succeeding round of interviews, respondents are presented with an analysis of the results of the previous set of interviews and are asked to supply further input. Although Delphi methods often are used to ascertain a consensus among a group of experts, the techniques were employed in this study to generalize the diverse experiences and opinions of the Guard sample.

Delphi poll techniques were implemented through telephone interviews with ARNG battalion-level administrative officers or equivalent personnel. The 102-person sample consisted of 2 administrative officers in each state except Maryland. Because only one administrative officer from Washington, D.C. was available, a third officer from Maryland, whose unit draws members from D.C., was included. Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands were excluded from the sample because of time and budget constraints. Battalion administrative officers were consulted for two reasons. First, they are full-time Guard personnel who should have expert experiential knowledge of how the Guard functions. Second, because of their structural position between the state Guard office and companies, battalion administrative officers are well placed to understand many of the opportunities and constraints units face as well as how a variety of units respond to their circumstances. Nevertheless, battalion administrative officers offer only one perspective about unit

*This research was conducted prior to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

supportability. If samples of recruiters or company commanders were drawn, visions of the factors influencing unit supportability could be quite different.

A list of administrative officers to contact for the surveys was obtained through ARNG Regional Recruiting Managers (RRMs). Letters were sent to RRM's describing the purpose of the study and requesting the names of two administrative officers in each state (and in the District of Columbia) in their jurisdiction. Researchers do not know how or why particular individuals were selected. For instance, it is possible that individual administrative officers were chosen because their units were viewed as particularly successful—or unsuccessful. It also is possible that people with whom the RRM's had good (or bad) working relations were selected. A variety of selection rationales likely were used and, although the sample is not random, the range of views obtained from the sample probably was unbiased.

Once researchers received the names of Guard personnel to contact, it became clear that not all of the respondents would be battalion administrative officers. While in some instances this situation may be attributable to the fact that there was no administrative officer to contact, in other cases there was no obvious explanation. Researchers did not seek to probe this issue further, nor did they alter the interview protocols when speaking to people who were not administrative officers. All data were treated as though they came from battalion-level administrative officers or their equivalents.

The Delphi poll technique used in this study involved a sequence of two telephone interviews with each of the 102 respondents. Surveys were developed by ORNL researchers in conjunction with the ARNG Recruiting and Retention Bureau. All questions in the first survey were open-ended; there were no scaled or multiple choice questions. This approach was taken for two related reasons. First, the study was exploratory and sought to acquire a wide range of information about unit supportability. Second, interviews with battalion administrative officers were meant to obtain the officers' opinions

within their respective frameworks. Using scaled or multiple choice questions would have imposed the researchers' framework on the respondents, with the distinct possibility that the researchers' framework would not be in alignment with respondents' frameworks. Further, to ensure that interviewers understood and accurately recorded the points made by respondents, interviewers summarized the answers from each section of the survey for immediate review by respondents. This technique improved data collection accuracy and enabled respondents to elaborate on their answers. The bulk of the second survey was closed-format. This approach was appropriate because the second survey was constructed from data gathered in the first set of interviews.

The first interview protocol, reproduced in Appendix A, introduced the study, asked background questions, and then solicited definitions both of unit supportability and a lack of unit supportability. In introducing the survey, interviewers assured respondent confidentiality. Although the researchers needed respondents' names, addresses, and telephone numbers, data from the interviews were kept separately from any identifying information. The first portion of the interview asked background questions about the following items: the respondent's service in the Guard; the nature of the battalion and its companies; the kinds of recruits desired and obtained; and the definition of "unit." Background information generally provided information to help researchers understand the context of the officers' responses. Researchers asked respondents to define "unit" because of preliminary indications that the term could have a variety of meanings, ranging from detachment to brigade (it was important to know what specific level of Guard organization was under discussion).

The primary purpose of the first interview was to obtain interviewees' concepts of the components of unit supportability. These concepts were ascertained by first asking respondents to define unit supportability. Follow-up questions were based upon respondents' answers, centering on the factors contributing to unit supportability. Another question inquired about formal or informal

measures for assessing unit supportability. To uncover the most information possible about healthy units, respondents also were asked to define a lack of unit supportability. As with the questions pertaining to unit supportability, interviewees were asked to delineate factors contributing to a lack of unit supportability. Respondents also were asked how they measured a lack of unit supportability. The final question asked what actions respondents took if they discovered that a particular unit was not healthy.

Five ORNL researchers conducted telephone interviews. Interviewers were instructed to note as much information as possible during the interviews and to review notes for completeness and clarity after each interview. Data from the interviews were entered by interviewers into dBASE III Plus* data bases and later were checked for accuracy. Answers first were coded by topic and then were counted for analytic purposes. One individual's response could have been coded in multiple categories. For instance, if a respondent said that unit supportability was dependent on the area's economy, on the population available for recruiting, and on feelings of camaraderie within Guard units, that answer would have been coded into three different categories. Also, if a respondent said that new equipment and a new armory were important to unit supportability, for example, that answer was counted more than once for a single category.

Coded responses to questions asking about factors contributing both to unit supportability and to a lack of unit supportability were compiled into ten unit supportability criteria. The resulting criteria represented groupings by topic of the wide variety of answers obtained from the first interview. In developing the list of criteria, researchers considered both the number of responses in any one category and the nature of responses. Some criteria were not suggested frequently, but their

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substance was deemed important for inclusion in the list of criteria to be ranked. The resulting ten criteria, discussed in the next section of this report, incorporated the majority of responses pertaining to unit supportability.

Once the criteria were developed, letters were sent to each of the respondents in the first interview in preparation for the second telephone interview. The letters thanked the respondents for their participation in the study and asked them to rank the ten criteria in order of importance for unit supportability. Criteria were listed in alphabetical order so the responses would not be biased. Soon after the letters were mailed, the second telephone interviews were initiated by four ORNL researchers. The interview protocol, reproduced in Appendix B, simply solicited each respondent's rankings and asked him* why he ranked the criteria in that order. Interviewers were instructed to discourage ties in rankings, allow respondents to rank a criterion "0" if that criterion was deemed completely irrelevant, permit respondents to add criteria as needed and not reveal these instructions during the interview unless necessary. Another methodological dilemma arose during the course of interviews: occasionally, respondents volunteered more than one set of rankings, depending on context (e.g., different rankings for recruiting than for retention). Researchers allowed these distinctions to be made but did not solicit them. After the interviews were completed, data were entered into a dBASE III Plus** data base for analysis.

Ranked criteria were analyzed quantitatively in several ways. The number of respondents assigning ranks one through ten to each criterion was counted. Mean rankings also were determined for each criterion. These counts and mean rankings were performed on the sample as a whole and

*There were no female respondents.

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according to Recruiting and Retention Advisory Committee (RRAC) area and battalion class. RRAC area analyses were conducted to see how geography (i.e., different regions of the United States) might influence perceptions of unit supportability. Analyses according to battalion class were designed to determine if the functional requirements of units affected conceptions of unit supportability. Battalion class was derived by translating respondents' reports of the kinds of battalions with which they were associated into one of three classes of unit types used by ORNL for other portions of the RRPM (Rizy, Bjornstad, and Vogt 1991).

3. UNIT SUPPORTABILITY FINDINGS

This section reports findings regarding unit supportability. Data pertaining to the components of unit supportability and the lack of unit supportability, RRAC area, and battalion class were analyzed. Other data that were recorded but not analyzed are presented in Appendix C.

Table 1 presents the initial coding of factors contributing to unit supportability and to a lack of unit supportability; the responses are arranged in alphabetical order. Respondents' views of the factors contributing to unit supportability were varied and sometimes complex. As can be seen in Table 1, factors ranged from family support for recruits, to the ability of recruits to mediate between unit needs and the community, to exciting training opportunities, to seeing that recruits are paid on time. Some overall themes were apparent in administrative officers' responses, but those themes could be played out quite differently in respondents' minds. One example of this situation was an area's economic status. Economic issues were raised nearly 65 times in discussions about supportability and a lack thereof, but the picture painted was complex. Extremes of low and high unemployment both were cited as bad for unit supportability. A stable economy, but one without much part-time job availability, was deemed good. Areas where significant seasonal employment shifts occurred reportedly made unit supportability difficult.

Some of the discussions of unit supportability factors were contradictory. For example, competition for recruits from other Guard units or other military services was judged as both good and bad influences on unit supportability. Different respondents saw rural areas as inducing and constraining unit supportability. Some interviewees thought that a rural environment impeded recruitment but enhanced retention.

Table 1. Components of unit supportability: initial coding of responses provided by ARNG administrative officers

Supportability		Lack of Supportability	
Responses	Number of times response was given	Responses	Number of times response was given
Character/Quality of Recruits			
Individuals who support the military and its goals	2		
No drugs	1		
Work hard	3		
Community Support for Guard		Community Relations	
From Community: support and positive attitude about Guard/military on local and state level	25	Anti-military political climate	7
• employers cooperative	8	Lack of awareness of Guard	1
From Guard: community awareness of and involvement in activities	29	Poor location of armory	2
• visibility of Guard and armory in community and use of armory	9	Poor community relations (must be active in community)	7
Have community leaders, teachers, and principals in BN or have good relation with community leaders	5	Poor employer relations/support	3
		Poor, or lack of, community support	18
Demographics		Demographics	
Age pool appropriate for recruiting	10	Below authorized strength	7
High school and college recruiting base	6	General*	7
MOSs supportable in area (general or unknown reason); people who have aptitude for the work	2	Unit type in inappropriate geographic area	6
Near city/urban area (or not in rural area), therefore schools and industry so that Guard does not lose people when they go to college; city area provides technically skilled people	8	Many transients; people leave Guard after short while	9
Number of people; population density	28	Median age not optimum	5
People with right skills; adequate education level; matching unit types to skills existing in area	13	People leave to go to school (as in rural areas)	6
Small town (greater retention and easier to recruit)	3	Skills available in area do not match those required for MOS	6
Unit type must fit geography of area (e.g., no tank units in New York City)	2	Too few students, schools from which to recruit	2
Variety of MOSs that allow different people and varied skill types (including women)	5	Too small recruiting base; not enough people	33

Table 1. Continued

Supportability		Lack of Supportability	
Responses	Number of times response was given	Responses	Number of times response was given
Economic Factors		Economic Factors	
Economic impact of Guard (money and jobs for community)	2	Both high employment and low employment are bad	1
If economy is down, then recruiting is up	5	Conflicts with job and school	4
Industrial economy of area must allow training time (e.g., intensive summer businesses conflict with Guard training time)	1	High-income areas are bad; low-income areas good; economy (general)	2
Mid- to low-income area so that recruiting is easier	3	Industrial and economic base not conducive to training time (weekends, 2-week training)	3
Need stable economy (but not too many part-time jobs available); poor economy is bad because people must leave to find jobs	13	Low unemployment, high employment, good economy are bad	7
		Poor economy is bad; too few jobs in area; unstable or seasonal jobs	24
Family Involvement and Support		Family Involvement and Support	
General	15	Conflicts between Guard and family (time); lack of family support	6
Leadership		Leadership	
Adequate number and good full-timers	11	Affects retention	2
Develop caring personal relations, individualized attention	11	Insufficient candidates for leaders in rural areas (because of less education)	1
Good leadership (general)	26	Lack of command climate or poor command climate	27
Leaders have positive attitudes and motivate weekenders	5	Leadership lives outside community and does not interact regularly with community	1
Levels of leadership coordinate well together to focus on priorities	6	NCOs for administrative duties (too few or too burdened)	7
Recognizing achievement by awards	2	Planning within resources; not setting goals or achievable goals; not achieving goals	2
Relate well with ranks; deal with problems effectively; fair discipline	7	Personnel (general)	1
		Poor management; not addressing important issues (also associated with recruiting/retention)	3
		Poor relations between people; failure to take care of individuals and acknowledge commitments other than ARNG	5
		Too few full-time people	11

Table 1. Continued

Supportability		Lack of Supportability	
Responses	Number of times response was given	Responses	Number of times response was given
Recruiting and Recruiters		Recruiting and Recruiters	
Gain support for Guard in schools	4	Competition from other BNs or military	11
Good recruiting (general); recruiter involved in community and at ease with people	13	Poor image of recruiters	1
Recruiting and reenlistment incentives (tuition, bonuses)	11	National ads focus on helicopters and tanks too much	1
Targeting candidates for particular jobs	2	No interest in Guard in the area	1
Unit involvement in recruiting	2	Poor, inadequate (should be full-time)	7
		Recruiters should have burden of meeting authorized strength, not company commanders	1
		6-year commitment too great for high school/18-year-old people to handle	1
		Time between signup and actually working in the unit is too long	1
		Too great an effort required to meet authorized strength	1
		Unit officers not involved in recruiting	1
Resources		Resources	
Good facilities, training areas, and equipment	21	Armory (or station) too far from recruits	1
General (or money)	4	Disparity in bonuses between unit types	1
Location of armory close to where most unit members live	4	Equipment/facilities unavailable or poor	17
		Great distance between units and armory training areas	6
		Great distance between units in BN	4
		Lack of money for travel, MOS school	6
Retention			
General	7		
Need full-time retention NCO	3		
Resulting from good training and camaraderie	7		

Table 1. Continued

Supportability		Lack of Supportability	
Responses	Number of times response was given	Responses	Number of times response was given
Training		Training	
Dynamic, active training	3	Training is not challenging and active; does not accomplish something	9
Flexible training (determined by BN level) (to accommodate holidays and special situations like subsistence hunting in Alaska)	4	Incomplete, inadequate, not good (e.g., because of lack of live fire sites, poor use of time)	9
Good training (general)	17	Need standardized, stable MOS requirements	1
Sense of purpose; doing something valuable, exciting, and interesting	21	Too much time devoted to red tape and administrative things	1
Short training periods (realistic training) allows good performance at regular job upon return, i.e., not too exhausted	7	Training requires too much time (for E-6 and above, and in general)	3
Support of natives for training activities	1		
Training of value outside of Guard	2		
Training that will help when activated	1		
Unit Characteristics		Unit Characteristics	
Competition with other units is good	2	Add social dimension; Guard is not just business	1
Esprit de corps (and sense of belonging in the unit)	10	Drugs, gangs, unmotivated people (inner-city)	1
Good working environment (general)	2	Numerous dishonorable discharges or AWOLs	2
Historical link with units preceding this one	2	Perceived lack of upward mobility	2
No or little competition from other military units	6	Poor attitude in unit/lack of unit pride/low morale/no esprit de corps	9
Unit image/reputation	3	Lack of pride in work (individual)	1
Unit pride	4	Unit reorganizations (people leave; changes nature of Guard itself)	2
Work with friends or relatives	3		

*"General" indicates that the interviewee said that demographics of a location could contribute to insupportability, but did not elaborate on the response.

Note: Numbers represent total responses in each category.

Abbreviations and acronyms: BN = battalion, AWOL = absent without leave; MOS = military occupational specialty, and NCO = non-commissioned officer.

The distinction between recruiting and retention raises an important issue regarding the definition of unit supportability. Unit supportability is a vague phrase that can be interpreted in a number of ways in different contexts. The constituents of a supportable, successful, or healthy unit might vary as one thinks of unit formation, unit retention, or the unit's ability to function, for example. Except in the rare cases when respondents specified how they were thinking, it is impossible to know with certainty if interviewees were considering unit recruiting, retention, functioning, or a combination of contexts when answering interview questions. Analyses therefore were conducted on the entire set of responses to unit supportability questions.

3.1 TEN UNIT SUPPORTABILITY CRITERIA

The preliminary coding of data on unit supportability and a lack of unit supportability (Table 1) was evaluated and transformed into the ten unit supportability criteria depicted in Table 2.

Table 2. Ten unit supportability criteria

1.	Community Attitudes and Interactions
2.	Economic Conditions
3.	Esprit de Corps
4.	Full-Time Staff and Non-Commissioned Officers
5.	Leadership
6.	Money, Benefits, and Bonuses
7.	Opportunities
8.	Population Base for Recruiting
9.	Recruiters and Recruiting Methods
10.	Resources

First, response categories were assessed to see if they satisfactorily encompassed the major themes evident in the data. Some reorganizing resulted from this evaluation. For instance, items such as

bonuses, money, and educational benefits that had been placed in several different categories were combined in a new category. The following paragraphs describe the components of each of the supportability criteria. Value-laden descriptors were minimized in defining the ten criteria, largely because the criteria reflected components of unit supportability (e.g., esprit de corps, leadership) and did not constitute optimal measures of successful units (e.g., good esprit de corps, exemplary leadership). The ten criteria are elaborated as follows:

1. *Community actions and interactions.* Community-generated and Guard-generated actions and interactions were reported to be important to unit supportability. From the community, respondents said that a positive—or at least a neutral—attitude toward the Guard eased recruiting and created a positive atmosphere for Guard members. On the other hand, Guard visibility in the community was reported to have similar effects. A number of respondents specified that active Guard involvement in the community (e.g., helping in disaster relief or making the armory available for community use) and vice versa (e.g., donating land for the armory) affected unit supportability. Another element of this criterion involved community leaders' membership in, or at least support of, the ARNG.
2. *Economic conditions.* A number of factors contribute to economic conditions. These factors include the unemployment rate, the stability of employment throughout the year and over the course of several years, the economic base and its suitability for needed military occupational specialties, and competition for recruits from other Guard units and military services. As has been discussed, economic conditions were seen to affect unit supportability in a complex way. Many respondents thought that very good and very bad economic conditions constrained unit supportability.
3. *Esprit de corps.* This criterion incorporates a number of characteristics of ARNG units; unit pride and morale, feelings of camaraderie within the Guard, and a sense of belonging are important components of "esprit de corps."

4. *Full-time staff and non-commissioned officers (NCOs).* An adequate number of quality full-time staff and NCOs is needed for unit supportability; full-time staff and NCOs ensure that soldiers are paid on time, arrange transportation, and provide logistical support during training exercises. NCOs also contribute to unit supportability by serving as a communication link between the ranks and leaders.
5. *Leadership.* Leadership is somewhat complex in nature in that it incorporates intangible factors such as dealing fairly with people, relating well to others, and having a positive attitude and motivational skills. The ability to plan training and establish goals for the unit is another aspect of this criterion.
6. *Money, benefits, and bonuses.* The salary and educational benefits offered by the ARNG are tangible rewards that contribute to unit supportability, particularly in terms of attracting recruits.
7. *Opportunities.* Opportunities include personal rewards less concrete than money and benefits. Exciting and challenging training can provide skills and experiences that contribute to unit supportability. Opportunities for personal achievement within the Guard and in civilian life are included in this criterion.
8. *Population base for recruiting.* Having an adequate number of persons from which to draw allows the unit to reach and maintain authorized strength, an important factor in unit supportability. Other characteristics of population that enhance unit supportability are having individuals with adequate educational backgrounds and job skills compatible with the unit's needs and having an adequate pool of persons in the desirable age range.
9. *Recruiters and recruiting methods.* Because the recruiter serves as a liaison between the ARNG and the community, his or her knowledge of both is important to unit supportability. The recruiter

must be familiar with unit manpower needs, and work to find recruits suitable to these needs, interact well with the community, and establish ties to sources of manpower such as high schools.

10. *Resources.* The availability and adequacy of training equipment and areas enhance the training experience and, thus, contribute to unit supportability. Also, the availability of funds necessary for training and travel is important.

Six of the ten criteria are characteristic of Guard units themselves; correspondingly, they are controlled by the Guard. These criteria are (1) Full Time Staff and NCOs; (2) Leadership; (3) Money, Benefits, and Bonuses; (4) Opportunities; (5) Recruiting and Recruiting Methods; and (6) Resources.

Two criteria, Population Base and Economic Conditions, are elements of the communities in which Guard units are located and are factors external to the Guard units.

Two other criteria, Community Actions and Interactions and Esprit de Corps, are influenced by both the Guard and the community. For example, Community Actions includes both the community's attitude about the Guard and Guard actions in the community. Also, Esprit de Corps may be fostered in a Guard unit because of the unit's history, its reputation, or members' individual personalities. However, it also may be influenced positively or negatively by the participation of groups of individuals who associate with each other outside of the Guard (e.g., family members or individuals from the same neighborhood or ethnic community).

3.1.1 Overall Rankings of Supportability Criteria

Respondents were asked to rank the 10 criteria in order of their importance to unit supportability, with 1 being the most important and 10 being the least. The numeric rankings are

relative; they do not demonstrate the degree to which respondents envisioned one criterion to be more important than another because the intervals between the numbers are not equal. For instance, some respondents may have said that two criteria were essential to unit supportability and that the other criteria were far less important. In such a case, the distance between rankings of 1 and 2 may have been virtually non-existent, but the distance between 2 and 3 may have been enormous. Mean rankings therefore give an idea of what criteria the respondents thought were more important than the others.

The list of ten criteria apparently succeeded in capturing respondents' ideas on unit supportability. Two pieces of evidence support this conclusion. First, no respondents said that the criteria were irrelevant. Second, only once did a respondent mention a criterion different from the ten on the list.

Several of the criteria, however, may be interrelated. For instance, Recruiting and Recruiting Methods may be dependent on several factors, including Leadership, Economic Conditions, and Money, Benefits, and Bonuses. Both in defining supportability criteria and in ranking them, respondents readily treated the criteria separately. Nevertheless, the interrelatedness of the criteria may be one reason that most rankings are not statistically different* from one another.

Figure 1 shows the mean rankings of each of the 10 supportability criteria for the entire sample of 102 battalion administrative officers or their equivalents. The rankings for most of the criteria are not distinguishable statistically. Nevertheless, the extreme ranks are quite clear. Leadership consistently is ranked as the most important criterion for unit supportability, whereas Resources as well as Recruiters and Recruiting Methods fall at the other extreme. There are two

*T-tests were conducted on the difference of average means, using a 95% significance level.




Fig. 1. Rankings of ten unit supportability criteria.

major points to be made regarding these findings. First, Leadership is a criterion that cannot be operationalized for the RRPM because there is no reason to believe that demographic and economic factors external to the Guard influence the quality of leadership within the Guard. Second, the placement of Recruiters and Recruiting Methods at the bottom of the list of criteria may be a consequence of the population of Guard experts sampled. It is possible that battalion administrative officers are more concerned with the retention and functioning of units than with recruiting. If recruiters had been interviewed instead of administrative officers, the unit supportability criteria might have been different, and Recruiters and Recruiting Methods almost certainly would not have been ranked tenth. Alternatively, Recruiters and Recruiting Methods may have been ranked last because of a belief that even very aggressive recruiting cannot dramatically improve a unit that is located in a poor market.

3.1.2 Rankings of Supportability Criteria by Recruiting and Retention Advisory Committee Area

RRAC areas are the seven regional geographic divisions the Guard uses for administrative purposes (see Fig. 2). Although the divisions essentially are arbitrary, the different RRAC areas are thought to differ from one another. To see if geographic area in some way affected rankings of unit supportability criteria, the rankings were analyzed according to RRAC area. Figures 3–9 depict the mean rankings of criteria in each RRAC area. Although the rankings vary to some degree among RRAC areas, Leadership again consistently is ranked as the most important criterion. There is one exception to this. In RRAC area 4, Leadership is ranked second in importance to Population Base,




Fig. 2. Recruiting and Retention Advisory Committee areas.

Fig. 3. Rankings of criteria by Recruiting and Retention Advisory Committee (Area 1) (N = 15).




Fig. 4. Rankings of criteria by Recruiting and Retention Advisory Committee (Area 2) (N = 14).




Fig. 5. Rankings of criteria by Recruiting and Retention Advisory Committee (Area 3) (N = 18).




Fig. 6. Rankings of criteria by Recruiting and Retention Advisory Committee (Area 4) (N = 14).





Fig. 7. Rankings of criteria by Recruiting and Retention Advisory Committee (Area 5) (N = 17, 18).



* ONE RESPONDENT GAVE RANKINGS FOR DIFFERENT SCENARIOS, AND DID NOT RANK EACH CRITERION IN THE SECOND SCENARIO.

Fig. 8. Rankings of criteria by Recruiting and Retention Advisory Committee (Area 6) (N = 16).





Fig. 9. Rankings of criteria by Recruiting and Retention Advisory Committee (Area 7) (N = 12).



but the difference is not statistically significant.* At the other end of the scale, more variation in response is evident. Nevertheless, Resources or Recruiters and Recruiting Methods generally are at the bottom of the list. Note that in RRAC area 7, which includes the west coast and Alaska, Resources is ranked more important than six other criteria.

This report represents the first venture into a new area of research—Guard-members' perceptions of the components of successful units. The initial stage of any new research is to provide definitions and descriptive results. At this stage of the research agenda, only descriptive analytical

*T-tests were conducted on the difference of average means, using a 95% significance level.

results are presented. Additional data and analyses are needed to explain why mean unit supportability criteria rankings vary by RRAC area.

3.1.3 Rankings of Supportability Criteria by Battalion Class

In the course of the first telephone interview, respondents were asked about the kinds of battalions with which they were associated. Eighteen general battalion types were reported (see Table 3). These battalion types were re-classified into one of three unit classes for two reasons.

Table 3. Battalion types and classes

Number of respondents	Battalion type ^a	Battalion class ^b
20	Field Artillery	Combat
13	Infantry	Combat
8	Mechanized Infantry	Combat
7	Armored	Combat
4	Light Infantry	Combat
3	Armored Cavalry	Combat
3	Aviation	Combat
2	Chaparral—Air defense	Combat
1	Mountain Infantry	Combat
7	Combat Engineer	Support
6	Supply and Service	Support
6	Signal	Support
4	Military Police	Support
4	Support	Support
3	Engineering	Support
2	Combat Heavy Engineers	Support
5	HQ Troop Command	Service
3	Maintenance	Service
1	Transportation	Service

^aBattalion type as reported by interview respondents.

^bBattalion class, as used in RRPM.

First, as can be seen in Table 3, the number of respondents in most of the individual categories is small; statistical analyses therefore would have provided very little meaningful information. Second, using three more general classes—combat, service, and supply—allows the results of unit supportability research to be integrated more easily with other RRPM-related research that uses the same three unit classes (e.g., Rizer, Bjornstad, and Vogt 1991). Table 3 lists the number of interviewees who reported belonging to particular battalion types and how those battalion types were translated into battalion classes. The majority of respondents were in combat battalions, followed by support and then service battalions.

Leadership again was ranked most important for unit supportability. It clearly was the most important criterion for combat and supply classes. Leadership was second to Opportunity for service battalions, though the difference between the two rankings was not statistically significant.* The criteria ranked least important for unit supportability were Recruiters and Recruiting Methods and Resources. For combat and service battalions, Community was another criterion ranked toward the bottom of the scale. There was little differentiation between mean rankings for the other criteria. Figures 10–12 depict mean rankings of supportability criteria by battalion class. As was the case for analyses by RRAC area, the variations in mean rankings can be presented, but there are too few data about the different battalion classes to offer explanations for the findings.

*T-tests were conducted on the difference of average means, using a 95% significance level.

Fig. 10. Rankings of criteria by battalion class (combat) (N = 62).




Fig. 11. Rankings of criteria by battalion class (support) (N = 31).





Fig. 12. Rankings of criteria by battalion class (service) (N = 10).



4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This project was undertaken to help improve the RRPM and to expand the understanding of the constituents of successful Guard units. More specifically, the study goals were to define and rank factors contributing to healthy units from the point of view of Guard personnel and, if possible, to operationalize some criteria for use in the RRPM. A Delphi approach was taken in the study. This approach used a sequential polling technique to ascertain expert opinions. Therefore, two telephone interviews were conducted with each Guard expert. The expert population sample consisted of battalion-level administrative officers or equivalent personnel. Two experts in each state and the District of Columbia (one expert was with a Maryland battalion that draws members from the D.C. area) were interviewed, for a total of 102 respondents. In conducting the study, the phrase "unit supportability" was used to elicit opinions about successful units. The first interview acquired background information and definitions of unit supportability and lack of unit supportability. After these data were analyzed and compiled into a list of ten unit supportability criteria, the same experts were asked to rank the criteria in order of importance.

The mean rankings of most of the ten unit supportability criteria largely were indistinguishable from one another, except at the extremes. Leadership consistently was ranked as the most important factor influencing unit supportability, whether analyses were conducted for the entire sample or according to RRAC area or battalion class. This criterion could not be operationalized for the RRPM, however, because there is no evidence that factors such as demographics and economics that are external to the Guard have any bearing on the quality of leadership within the Guard. Nevertheless, as explained by interview respondents, Leadership is a complex criterion; it involves skills in interpersonal relations, motivational skills, managerial skills, goal-setting and goal-attainment

abilities, a positive attitude, and concern for Guard recruits in and outside of the context of the ARNG. The other criteria either were statistically indistinguishable or were not considered particularly important. There was no need to operationalize those criteria because they could not contribute productively to the RRPM.

At the opposite end of the scale, Resources and also Recruiters and Recruiting Methods consistently were ranked least important for unit supportability. Resources include quality, age, and funding for training equipment, the armory, and travel expenses. The Recruiters and Recruiting Methods criterion incorporates the ability of the recruiter to know the needs of the Guard unit and the composition of the community and to find suitable recruits. It is possible that this criterion was ranked as relatively unimportant because battalion administrative officers are more concerned with the retention and functioning of Guard personnel than with recruiting.

In fact, one caveat of this study is that the findings represent the views of one category of the Guard population. The administrative officers (and their equivalents) who were interviewed in all likelihood represent the diversity of opinions within that group. Nevertheless, had the same two questionnaires been administered to recruiters, company commanders, or recruits, the results might have been quite different. Separate populations within the Guard might consider different criteria to be important to supportable units and might focus on different aspects of unit supportability. The existence of distinctive views of unit supportability—from the perspectives of recruiting, retention, and functioning, for example—places another caveat on this study: while negative evidence indicates that the administrative officers typically did not view supportability in terms of recruiting, respondents' actual frameworks for viewing supportability are unknown.

Three kinds of additional research would strengthen the results from this project. First, explanations of the findings could be developed with analyses of the other data gathered during the

first telephone interviews and with analyses using demographic and socioeconomic data that already are used in the RRPM. Assessing the ranked criteria in light of factors such as population density, average income, and manufacturing and industrial bases also may be the most practical way to incorporate the results of the telephone surveys into the RRPM. Second, respondents' original answers could be analyzed to uncover informative patterns of response, particularly regarding topics (e.g., labor markets or recruiting) relevant in other RRPM-related studies. These patterns then could inform additional investigations. Third, investigating the views of other Guard personnel would provide a much more complete picture of unit supportability. Nevertheless, this study has enhanced the understanding of Guard functioning by systematically delineating and ranking the factors that contribute to healthy units. Anecdotes about the components of successful units now can be replaced by systematically identified Guard perspectives.

5. LITERATURE CITED

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Merkhofer, Miley W. 1986. *Decision Science and Social Risk Management: A Comparative Evaluation of Cost-Benefit Analysis, Decision Analysis, and Other Formal Decision-Aiding Approaches*, Dordrecht, D. Reidel.

Rizy, C. G., Bjornstad, D. J., and Vogt, D. P. 1991. *Analysis of Military Occupational Specialty in Army Guard Units*, ORNL/TM-11680, prepared for the National Guard Bureau by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

Interview code number: _____

INTRODUCTION

Introduce yourself... from Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Working on project for National Guard Bureau, ARNG Recruiting and Retention Management Center on unit supportability with the ultimate goal of developing a computer model to help predict where new or modified units are likely to be supportable. Our focus is on supportability primarily with regard to personnel (rather than material). We want your help in defining unit supportability. Your name was suggested to us by your state's recruiting manager. We understand that Lt. Col. John Runner sent you a letter explaining the study and saying that we would be calling. The interview will take approximately 30 minutes.

As Lt. Col. Runner's letter indicated, we will interview you twice. Today's interview is intended to help us learn your criteria for unit supportability. After talking to National Guard personnel around the country, we will create a list of unit supportability criteria, which we then will ask you to rank in order of importance. Before the second interview, we will mail you the list of criteria. To do that, we need your correct mailing address (can be a home address if person so desires).

ADDRESS: _____

Interview is confidential. We know who you are for the purposes of conducting the research. But, you will not be identifiable in any report resulting from the research. Information will not be compiled by name and individuals will not be identified in data analysis.

Interview code number: _____

INTERVIEWER, NOTE:

- State calling: _____
- Write down as much as you can of what the person says. Don't hesitate to ask the person to wait while you write down what he says.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. What is your job position? (get job function, not just job title)

1a. Are you full-time or part-time?

1b. How long have you been in this job position?

1c. What was your previous National Guard job position?

2. How long have you been in the ARNG?

3. What type of battalion? (functions)

Interview code number: _____

3a. Is this typical of the battalions in your state? your region?

3b. How many battalions in your state?

4. How many companies are in your battalion?

4a. Is that typical for your state? your region?

5. What type(s) of units constitute your battalion? (functions)

5a. To be sure that we're talking about the same thing, what do you mean by "unit" (company...detachment...)? (find out how the person conceptualizes organizational structure; be sure you know what person means by unit, and that the term is used consistently by that person)

Interview code number: _____

- 5b. What proportion of different unit types are in your battalion?
- 5c. How far apart geographically are these units located? Also try to discover unit distribution by size and number: Are there a number of small units spread over a large region or large units located in a centralized location?
6. How many organizational units (companies, battalions, etc.) operate from your armory?
7. What kinds of recruits do you want for your units (ages, backgrounds, skills...for different occupational specialties in the various units)? Are these the kinds of recruits who tend to join your units?

Interview code number: _____

7a. From what you said, it seems that you want people with these

backgrounds/skills/etc. _____, and that you tend to get people with these backgrounds/skills/etc.

_____. Do I understand you correctly?
Do you have anything to add?

SUPPORTABILITY

8. In your experience, what is unit supportability? IF person doesn't understand the question, try: What are the components of unit supportability?

8a. Host of follow-up questions. Ask person to explain what he means by each component mentioned. E.g., if says, successful fill rate, you ask (1) what he means by success, (2) what he means by fill rate, (3) for what organizational units are fill rates developed (units or battalions, at a local level or for the state...) (4) what are considered (by whom) to be acceptable (defined how) fill rates; (5) how much work is required to achieve acceptable fill rates (e.g., some over long periods of time or lots in spurts...); (6) how are high fill rates achieved; (7) what does it mean for the battalion and unit if fill rates are low. Continue to follow-up on person's statements.

--- Among the topics to address when appropriate:

- definitions of success
- recruiting: effort involved; problems related to
- retention: rates; factors affecting retention
- flow-through/turnover: general; in different categories
- location (e.g., mix and match of unit type and location)
- influence of leadership, training, equipment

8b. When finish one line of questioning, ask if there are any other attributes of unit supportability. And/or ask what factors are associated with unit supportability. Then continue to ask follow-up questions for what person says.

Interview code number: _____

9. What factors contribute to the supportability of a Guard unit? Follow-up questions.

SUPPORTABILITY

AFTER THROUGH WITH THIS LINE OF QUESTIONING, ASK:

10. From what you said, it seems that these are the crucial factors involved in unit supportability (list the factors you mention):

Do I understand you correctly? Do you have anything to add?

Interview code number: _____

11. Do you gauge different levels of supportability, or do you think of a unit as supportable or not supportable? If appropriate, how do you gauge different levels of supportability? Do you have formal measures for determining the level of supportability? If so, what? [These questions are trying to see (1) if the quality of a unit is important in supportability and (2) if there are formal measures of supportability.] Follow-up questions.

AFTER THROUGH WITH THIS LINE OF QUESTIONING, ASK:

12. From what you said, it seems that these are the ways you gauge unit supportability (list the things you mention):

Do I understand you correctly? Do you have anything to add?

LACK OF SUPPORTABILITY

13. What does it mean to you to say that a unit is not supportable (again, emphasis is on personnel)?

Interview code number: _____

- 13a. Host of follow-up questions. Ask person to explain what he means by each component mentioned. Continue to follow-up on person's statements.
- Among the topics to address when appropriate:
 - definitions of success
 - recruiting: effort involved; problems related to
 - retention: rates; factors affecting retention
 - flow-through/turnover: general; in different categories
 - location (e.g., mix and match of unit type and location)
 - influence of leadership, training, equipment
- 13b. When finish one line of questioning, ask if there are any other factors he associates with a lack of supportability. Then continue to ask follow-up questions for what person says.
- 13c. What factors contribute to the lack of supportability of a Guard unit? Follow-up questions.

AFTER THROUGH WITH THIS LINE OF QUESTIONING, ASK:

14. From what you said, it seems that these are the crucial factors leading to a lack of unit supportability (list the factors you mention):

Do I understand you correctly? Do you have anything to add?

Interview code number: _____

LACK OF SUPPORTABILITY

15. If there is a problem with unit supportability, what happens? (Get at different actions taken at different organizational levels by whom [position, not the name of the person]; interactions between different organizational levels; timing... Hierarchy or resort: what happens next...and then what happens...etc. Try to see what is considered to be a problem; if it's a problem if experienced by 1 unit or only by most/all units in the battalion or state.)

Interview code number: _____

AFTER THROUGH WITH THIS LINE OF QUESTIONING, ASK:

16. From what you said, it seems that this is what happens when there is a problem with unit supportability (list the factors you mention):

Do I understand you correctly? Do you have anything to add?

Thank person for his time and his help. Tell him we will phone again in several weeks, after analyzing the information we get from talking with other Guard people in similar job positions throughout the country. At that point, we'll want him to rank a list of factors that describe unit supportability. Before we call, we'll send a list of criteria.

Interview code number: _____

INTRODUCTION

Introduce yourself... from Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Working on project for National Guard Bureau, ARNG Recruiting and Retention Management Center on unit supportability with the ultimate goal of developing a computer model to help predict where new or modified units are likely to be supportable. This is the follow-up interview, where we want you to rank in order of importance the 10 criteria for unit supportability derived from 102 interviews with ARNG battalion administrative officers or people in similar positions. The interview should take just a few minutes.

As was the case for the first interview, this interview is confidential. We know who you are for the purposes of conducting the research. But, you will not be identifiable in any report resulting from the research. Information will not be compiled by name and individuals will not be identified in data analysis.

INTERVIEWER, NOTE:

- Write down as much as you can of what the person says. Don't hesitate to ask the person to wait while you write down what he says.

Interview starts on the next page.

Interview code number: _____

Criterion 1. COMMUNITY ATTITUDES AND INTERACTIONS [RANK: ___]

positive (or at least neutral) attitude toward Guard; active involvement of Guard in community (beyond visibility; civic-mindedness) and vice versa (use of armory; possibly donating land for armory...)

Criterion 2. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS [RANK: ___]

unemployment rate; stability of employment throughout the year and over the course of several years; kinds of local employment opportunities (industries, agriculture, etc.); competition for recruits (from other Guard units and other military)

Criterion 3. ESPRIT DE CORPS [RANK: ___]

unit pride and morale; feelings of companionship; sense of belonging

Criterion 4. FULL-TIME STAFF AND NCOs [RANK: ___]

adequate number of NCOs and full-time staff members; sense of responsibility; quality of work

Criterion 5. LEADERSHIP [RANK: ___]

responsible leadership (making sure units are where they should be for drills, etc.; making sure soldiers have food, equipment, and are paid on time); concern for soldiers; recognizing that the soldiers have other commitments and that the Guard is a part-time job

Criterion 6. MONEY, BENEFITS, AND BONUSES GUARD OFFERS [RANK: ___]

salary; educational benefits; etc.

Criterion 7. OPPORTUNITIES GUARD PROVIDES [RANK: ___]

training that is exciting, challenging, fun, realistic, keeps people busy; educational opportunities; links with civilian jobs; upward mobility in Guard and civilian jobs

Criterion 8. POPULATION BASE FOR RECRUITING [RANK: ___]

demographics; number of people with appropriate job skills; educational backgrounds; and of the appropriate ages

Criterion 9. RECRUITERS AND RECRUITING METHODS [RANK: ___]

good recruiters (not just after numbers); recruiters who know and interact with the community; recruiters who know units and unit needs (involvement of unit leadership in recruiting)

Criterion 10. RESOURCES [RANK: ___]

availability and condition of equipment, armory, training areas and facilities, etc.; exposure to new equipment; funding

Interview code number: _____

Use this page for notes on: (1) why (generally) people ranked the criteria how they did; (2) what distinctions are made or not made between criteria; (3) the relative importance of certain criteria relative to others (e.g., if 1 or 2 criteria are far more important than any of the others); (4) criteria that are critical to unit supportability but missing from our list; (5) why certain criteria may be of no importance; etc.

APPENDIX C: DATA FROM THE FIRST TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS

The following information was obtained in the administering of the interview protocol included in Appendix A. Where feasible, the responses have been coded and enumerated. In some instances questions solicited detailed information which did not readily lend itself to coding. For example, one question asked "What types of units constitute your battalion?" Responses ranged from units of all one type to combinations of widely varied and unrelated units, and coding these different combinations of unit types was not feasible. Other data obtained in these interviews are included in the text, so they are not repeated here.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Job position:

<i>Administrative Officer</i>	46
<i>Executive Officer</i>	18
<i>Commander (Battalion)</i>	6
<i>Training Officer (including Training Technician)</i>	6
<i>Personnel Officer</i>	6
<i>Operations Officer (or Operations and Training Officer)</i>	5
<i>Supervisor</i>	3
<i>Battalion or Area Retention NCO</i>	2
<i>Plant and Operation Officer</i>	1
<i>Battalion ADR (SI personnel)</i>	1
<i>CEO</i>	1
<i>Brigade Personnel Adm (prior AO)</i>	1
<i>Personnel Staff NCO</i>	1
<i>Battalion Adjutant</i>	1
<i>Brigade Adjutant</i>	1
<i>Logistics Officer</i>	1
<i>Officer in Charge</i>	1
<i>Recruiter</i>	1

Full-time or part-time:

<i>Full time</i>	102
----------------------------	-----

Length of time in job position:

Mean = 28.9 months (or 2.4 years)

Number of companies per battalion:

Mean of 4.89 companies per battalion (numbers provided by respondents were used, though they occasionally included detachments in the enumeration)

Lowest number of companies per battalion = 2

Highest number of companies per battalion = 7

Type(s) of units that constitute each battalion:

(Combinations of unit types in the various battalion types surveyed are practically limitless and are, thus, not enumerated here. Responses ranged from all of one unit type in a battalion to several unrelated unit types within a battalion.)

A "Unit" is a

<i>Company (or Battery)</i>	55
<i>Company or Detachment</i>	28
<i>Brigade, Battalion, or Company</i>	4
<i>Battalion or Company</i>	3
<i>Battalion, Company, or Detachment</i>	3
<i>Battalion</i>	2
<i>Brigade, Battalion, Squad, Company</i>	1
<i>Company or Platoon</i>	1
<i>Company, Detachment or Platoon</i>	1
<i>Troop and Company (or Battery)</i>	1
<i>Corps, Company, Detachment</i>	1
<i>No Definition</i>	2

RECRUITS

Kinds of recruits wanted for units:

<u>Age</u>	
<i>17-30</i>	9
<i>17-25</i>	27
<i>17-20</i>	17
<i>20 +</i>	8
<i>Young</i>	5
<i>All or any age</i>	3

Prior Service

Prefer non prior service 40
Mix of prior and non prior service 18
Prefer prior service 5

Sex

Male (only) 40
Male (mostly) 13
Either sex 20

Education/Intelligence

General good education/intelligence 10
High school graduate (at least) 34
High school graduates and some GEDs 5
High school, college bound, and college students 12
Variety of intelligence levels 1

Skills or Aptitude

Good math skills 3
Technical skills 6
Electronic/computer/math background 11
Mechanical/maintenance background 8
Communication/English skills 3
Variety of skills 13
Skills to fit unit MOSs 1
Aptitude for outdoor activity 7
95 Bravo MOS and 10 Skill level (for MP) 1
No particular skills necessary because all can be trained 20

Character

Exhibit stability (especially through job, work experience, or career goals) 29

Physical Attributes

Particular height 2
General good physical shape 8

Commitment

Long term commitment to Guard 4

No Special Requirements

Can use anyone 6

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