Anatomy of a Tragedy: Fukushima Dai-Ichi March 2011

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Fukushima Dai-Ichi: Status before the Earthquake



Units 1, 2, and 3 operate at full power. Steam produced by water boiling in the reactor vessel flows through the turbine generating electricity and gets turned back into water within the condenser. The water is returned to the reactor vessel. Warmed sea water returns to the Pacific Ocean.

Fukushima Dai-Ichi: Status before the Earthquake

During normal operation, steam leaves the reactor vessel enters via nozzles connected to the main steam system piping.



The core shroud is an open metal can surrounding the reactor core. Slightly smaller in diameter than the reactor vessel, the shroud forces water down through the space between the vessel wall and shroud wall and then up through the reactor core.

During normal operation, makeup water to the reactor vessel enters via nozzles connected to the feedwater system piping.

The reactor core sits in the lower half of the reactor vessel.

Units 4, 5, and 6 were shut down for scheduled refueling and maintenance outages. All of the fuel from the Unit 4 reactor had been offloaded into its spent fuel pool in late 2010 to allow the core shroud to be replaced.

Unit 1, 2, and 3 Operating Reactors



Heat from the reactor core boils water in the reactor vessel. Steam flows through the turbine to the condenser. Sea water cools the steam back into water. The condensate pumps, condensate booster pumps, and feedwater pumps return filtered and pre-warmed water to the reactor vessel.

Unit 1-6 Spent Fuel Pools



Each unit has an individual spent fuel pool. With fuel pool gates installed, the spent fuel pool is physically isolated from the reactor well and reactor vessel. The spent fuel pool is cooled by water overflowing into a skimmer surge tank. Pumps route this water through a heat exchanger to cool it and a filter/demineralizer unit to purify it before returning it to the pool.

Unit 1, 2, and 3 Operating Reactors



The feedwater pumps inject makeup water to the reactor vessel. This water mixes with water draining from the steam separator and steam dryer and enters the jet pumps nozzles to flow to the bottom of the reactor vessel. It turns upward to flow through the reactor core. A steam/water mix passes through the steam separator and steam dryer. Steam leaves for the turbine.

Unit 1, 2, and 3 Operating Reactors



The Mark I primary containment features a drywell (the inverted lightbulb) and a torus (the donut) connected by eight vent pipes. The reactor building surrounds the primary containment. Steam and feedwater piping passes through the containment walls and reactor building to the turbine building.

Unit 1, 2, and 3 Operating Reactors



ABOVE: Looking down at a fuel assembly. The inverted U-shaped handle is used to pick up and move the assembly. The tops of fuel rods stick up into the holes of the spacer grid for proper alignment.

LEFT: A simulated fuel rod is cut open to show fuel pellets and the spring keeping them in place during handling.

Unit 1, 2, and 3 Shutdown Reactors



The earthquake is reported to have caused Units 1-3 to automatically shutdown and to disconnect the plant from its electrical grid. Even with emergency diesel generators, the condensate, condensate booster, and feedwater pumps are unavailable due to loss of the normal power supply.

Unit 1, 2, and 3 Shutdown Reactors

Plant Name	BWR Class	Product Line	Containment *Type	MWT	MWE	Power Density KW/L	NO. Fuel Bundles	NO. Control Rods	IC or RCIC	LPCI or RHR *4	Feed Pump Type	Bypass Capacity	RFC Type	HPCI or HPCS	NO. Relief Valves	Press. Control Initial / Backup	*Type Offgas
Oyster Creek	2	63	Mark I	1930	620	33.6	560	137	IC	–	M	45	MG*5	FWCI	4	EPR/ MPR	AMB
Nine Mile Point #1	2	63	Mark I	1850	620	34.0	532	129	IC	–	M&T	45	MG*5	FWCI	6	EPR/ MPR	Low Temp
Dresden #2	3	65	Mark I	2527	809	41.08	724	177	IC	LPCI	M	45	MG	HPCI	5	EHC/ EHC	AMB
Millstone	3	65	Mark I	2011	690	40.08	580	145	IC	LPCI	MM	100*(3)	MG	FWCI	3	EPR/ MPR	Low Temp
Dresden #3	3	66	Mark I	2527	809	41.08	724	177	IC	LPCI	M	45	MG	HPCI	5	EHC/ EHC	AMB
Monticello	3	66	Mark I	1670	545	40.6	484	121	RCIC	RHR (A)	M	15	MG	HPCI	4	EPR/ MPR	Comp
Quad Cities 1/2	3	66	Mark I	2511	809	40.9	724	177	RCIC	RHR (A)	M	45	MG	HPCI	5	EHC/ EHC	AMB
Pilgrim	3	66	Mark I	1998	655	40.5	580	145	RCIC	RHR (A)	M	26	MG	HPCI	4	EPR/ MPR	AMB
Brown's Ferry 1/2/3	4	67	Mark I	3293	1065	50.7	764	185	RCIC	RHR (A)	T	26	MG	HPCI	13	EHC/ EHC	AMB
Vermont Yankee	4	67	Mark I	1593	514	51.0	368	89	RCIC	RHR (A)	M	100*(3)	MG	HPCI	4	EPR/ MPR	AMB
Duane Arnold	4	67	Mark I	1658	538	51.0	368	89	RCIC	RHR (A)	M	26	MG	HPCI	6	EHC/ EHC	AMB
Peach Bottom 2/3	4	67	Mark I	3293	1065	50.7	764	185	RCIC	RHR (A)	T	26	MG	HPCI	11	EHC/ EHC	Comp
Cooper	4	67	Mark I	2381	778	50.6	548	137	RCIC	RHR (A)	T	26	MG	HPCI	8	Digital (W)	Low Temp
Hatch 1/2	4	67	Mark I	2436	786	51.2	560	137	RCIC	RHR (A)	T	26	MG	HPCI	9	EHC/ EHC	AMB
Brunswick #1	4	67	Mark I (C)	2436	821	51.2	560	137	RCIC	RHR (A)	T	100*(3)	MG	HPCI	9	EHC/ EHC	AMB
Brunswick #2	4	67	Mark I (C)	2436	821	51.2	560	137	RCIC	RHR (A)	T	26	MG	HPCI	9	EHC/ EHC	AMB

Unit 1 is a BWR/3 while Units 2 and 3 are BWR/4s. All BWR/4s feature a reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) to cool the reactor when the normal power supply is lost. Some BWR/3s have RCIC while older BWR/3s relied on an isolation condenser (IC) to perform this role.

Unit 2 and 3 Shutdown Reactors



The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system uses steam produced by the reactor core's decay heat to spin a turbine connected to a pump. This pump transfer water from the condensate storage tank (or torus as a backup) to the reactor vessel.

Unit 2 and 3 Shutdown Reactors



Even without operator action, the RCIC system is designed to maintain the water level between Level 2 and Level 8. If not already running, the RCIC system is automatically started when the water level drops below Level 2. And if not already stopped, the RCIC system automatically stops at Level 8.

Unit 1 Shutdown Reactor



The isolation condenser (IC) is a passive system using no pumps. Instead, steam produced by the reactor core's decay heat is routed through metal tubes within a large tank of water called the isolation condenser. The steam is converted back into water and flows by gravity to the reactor vessel. Unit 1 is a BWR/3. It may have had a RCIC system like Units 2 and 3, or may have had an isolation condenser.

Backup Power

Upon loss of the normal power supply, emergency diesel generators started and provided electrical power for safety systems needed to cool the reactor cores and ensure containment integrity.

Emergency Core Cooling Systems



Simplified diagram of reactor vessel injection systems

An array of emergency core cooling system pumps are installed to inject makeup water to the reactor vessel during an accident. At this plant, the pumps supply 58,270 gallons per minute – if electrical power is available.

Loss of Backup Power

The tsunami reportedly disabled the emergency diesel generators. This left the plant with no power except for direct current (dc) electricity provided by a bank of batteries. All the emergency core cooling systems, except RCIC, became useless.

Unit 2 and 3 Shutdown Reactors



Battery power to steam admission valves and turbine controls would have allowed the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system to continue operating. When the batteries depleted after around 8 hours, this source of makeup cooling water to the reactor vessels would have been lost.

Unit 1 Shutdown Reactor



Battery power for valves would have allowed the isolation condenser (IC) to continue recycling water to the reactor vessel. But even if battery power had remained available indefinitely, the water inside the isolation condenser would have boiled within about 90 minutes. Without makeup from pump-supplied sources, passive water makeup by the IC system would have been lost.

Meltdown Clock



Once the makeup cooling water provided by the RCIC system or the isolation condenser was lost, the reactor core's decay heat would have begun boiling away its protective cover of water. Nearly 200 inches of water normally covers the reactor core.

Meltdown Clock

As the water level dropped below the top of the reactor core, the temperature of the cladding of exposed fuel rods would have increased. Overheated cladding would have first blistered and burst, like the rod on the left. Continued heat-up would have resulted in more extensive damage, like the portion of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 core on the right.

Meltdown Clock



At high temperatures, the zirconium cladding for the fuel rods reacts with the steam vapor to produce large amounts of hydrogen gas. To protect against explosive mixtures, the drywell and torus airspace are inerted with nitrogen gas. The reactor building has little protection against hydrogen gas accumulation. Detonations destroyed the Unit 1, 3, and 4 reactor buildings.

More Clocks



The loss of normal and backup power also left the spent fuel pools without ready means of either cooling or makeup. The decay heat from the irradiated fuel began heating the water towards boiling and then boil-off. While on a longer time frame, the outcome of fuel damaged by overheating was the same as for the reactor cores.

Containment Barriers



Without adequate cooling, the Unit 1-3 reactor cores and the Unit 1-6 spent fuel pools were heading towards fuel damage caused by overheating. Radioactivity released from damaged fuel in the reactor core has two barriers between it and the environment; there is but one barrier against radioactivity released from damaged fuel in spent fuel pools.

Containment Barriers

Detonations of explosive mixtures of hydrogen gas destroyed the reactor containment buildings of Units 1, 3, and 4. There are no effective barriers against radioactivity released from their spent fuel pools and one less barrier against releases from their reactor cores.